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 2 
This article elaborates a multi-dimensional conceptualization and a longitudinal measurement 
of public support for the EU. Operationalizations of public support for the EU either follow a 
utilitarian (specific) one-dimensional conceptualization or include an additional dimension of 
affective (diffuse) support measured with feelings of European identity. Yet, the latter 
dimension has been dismissed as irrelevant or has been found to have declined, along with 
specific support, after the Maastricht Treaty. Drawing on Easton’s distinction between support 
for the political community and the sense of community, my analysis shows that affection is 
not the only indicator of diffuse support nor is a “thick collectivity” an essential condition to 
develop diffuse support.  Using Eurobarometer data, I demonstrate that the variation of 
diffuse support for the EU over time is indeed relevant and has behavioral consequences 
(Muller et al., 1982) as the investigation in those member-states that held a referendum on 
EU issues shows. 
 
Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005. 
 






The surprising rejection of the European Union’s (EU) Constitution by a majority of  French 
and Dutch electors in recent referenda has both invigorated the idea that public opinion 
matters in the process of European integration, and that the erosion of public support after the 
Maastricht Treaty has not ended. In turn, this lack of support has prompted commentators to 
envisage a bleak future for Europe. Different interpretations of these last events have been 
offered by the literature on EU support which follows either of the two main lines of 
explanation developed in the last thirty years. The major explanations are the utilitarian 
perspective that has dominated the literature on public support especially after the work of 
Gabel (1998) or cultural accounts (Inglehart, 1971; Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Diez 
Medrano, 2004).1 Although a few scholars have shown that both kinds of explanations play a 
role (Hooghe and Marks, 2004), the causal mechanisms remain unclear. Overall, empirical 
results have offered limited vision on the development of public support for the EU. 
The main problem within the debate of a lack of public support for the EU is that we 
do not know much about the kind of support that the EU is enjoying from its citizens. After 
thirty years of empirical research on public support for the EU, and a large array of 
explanations, we still have profound disagreement on the best indicators for measuring it. 
There has been much attention focused on explaining variation in support but little on how EU 
support is measured. Generally, the concept of public support for the EU is not well defined, 
the same concept is operationalized differently, and the same measurement is used as 
operationalization of different conceptualizations. The result is confusion, lack of comparability 
and little insights into the debate on the legitimacy of the EU, which is stirring both scientific 
and political debates. Therefore it is relevant to address the following question: How is public 
support towards integration structured?  
Operationalizations of public support for the EU either follow a utilitarian (specific) 
one-dimensional conceptualization or include an additional dimension of affective (diffuse) 
support measured with feelings of European identity. The latter dimension has been 
dismissed as irrelevant (Gabel, 1998) or has been found to have declined, along with specific 
support, after the Maastricht Treaty (Niedermayer, 1995). These empirical results reinforce 
Scharpf’s argument according to which diffuse support (input-oriented legitimacy) is precluded 
in the EU due to the lack of a ‘thick collective identity’. In turn, this confirms the preoccupation 
of Newman (2001) who warns that this assumption of preclusion makes democratic legitimacy 
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impossible at the EU level, and may be used to justify the argument that the EU must confine 
itself to certain forms of regulation. 
The distinction between affective versus utilitarian modes of EU support was 
introduced by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and has been quite influential in empirical 
analyses of support for the EU, as much as this distinction has been for analyses of public 
support at the national level (Dalton 1989, 2004; Norris, 1999). However in contrast with 
national investigations, when applied to the EU, there is greater attention paid to utilitarian 
support. So, despite its theoretical relevance for the stability of political systems (Easton, 
1965, 1975; Muller, Jukam, Seligon, 1982), the diffuse mode of support has been neglected in 
studies of EU support.  The goal of this paper is to address this deficit and better explore this 
important dimension of support. 
   The theoretical work of Easton (1965, 1975) on political support and his distinction 
between diffuse and specific modes of support, which seems to have inspired both works of 
Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and Scharpf (1999), is used as a starting point. Drawing on 
Easton’s distinction between support for the political community and the sense of community, 
my analysis shows that affection neither is the only indicator of diffuse support, nor is a “thick 
collectivity” an essential condition for developing diffuse support.  A more appropriate 
conceptualization of EU support based on Easton’s definition of political community is 
proposed and tested on a Eurobarometer longitudinal data set (1970-2004). The new 
measurement is examined over time and across countries, and compared with previous 
measurements of support. The implications of this measurement for further improvements of 
its explanations will be discussed. 
 
 
2 Existing Operationalizations Of Diffuse And Specific Support For 
The EU 
 
In the extant literature, cross-national and longitudinal variations in the level of public support 
for the EU have been measured by four different survey questions (available mainly in 
Eurobarometer data sets): the ‘Benefit’, the ‘Membership’, the ‘Dissolution’, and the 
‘Unification’.2 However, different scholars have interpreted these same questions in different 
ways.3 Whereas the ‘Benefit’ question has been considered as an indicator of specific support 
and the ‘Unification’ question as an indicator of diffuse support by almost all authors, the 
‘Membership’ and the ‘Dissolution’ questions have been approached differently. Because of 
these varying evaluations, accounts of support are also different.  
 The disagreements over the trends of affective or diffuse support illustrate these 
different interpretations. When describing the levels of public support for the EU from 1952 to 
1986, Inglehart and Reif were pleased to note that diffuse support4, had developed among 
both founding members and newcomers. On the other hand they notice that “… a large gap 
still existed between the attitudes of the original six publics and those of the six newer 
member nations admitted in 1973, 1981, and 1986…in regard to utilitarian support”5 (1991: 7),  
which in part they explained as due to the severe economic problems at the time of their 
accession. Contrary to these earlier findings, Niedermayer (1995) concludes that diffuse 
support,6 not utilitarian support, features in the gap between the original six member states 
and those that joined from 1973 up to 1985.  Then after the Maastricht Treaty, “… both diffuse 
and specific net support for the EC was in decline…” (1995: 67-69).  However, Gabel claims 
that ‘…a public legitimacy for the European Union, grounded in widespread affective 
attachments, did not exist even long before the recent public opposition to the Maastricht 
Treaty’ (1998: 32-33). Between 1985 and 1991 he noticed, “Only about one-fifth of the EU 
public expressed strong affective sentiments and this fraction seems to remain stable over 
time”7 (1998, 35).    
Disagreements on the use of different indicators for ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support 
seem to be a leitmotiv in the literature. Many scholars bypass the problem by discarding 
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Easton’s theoretical distinction, mainly on the basis of a lack of empirical tenability (Hewstone, 
1986) or on the argument that although empirically tenable, the specific/utilitarian support is 
more relevant compared to the little developed diffuse/affective support (Gabel, 1998). 
Common in the literature is the choice to opt for uni-dimensional operationalizations at just 
one point in time. This, on the one hand, might increase the range of choice in selecting 
survey questions, but on the other hand, it restricts the analyses to static ones.  
Common among scholars is to devise new indices of support for the EU composed of 
different questions. Yet, although the common goal is to improve measurement tools, the 
different items’ compositions of different constructs tend to jeopardize comparability across 
studies. Overall, the ‘Membership’ indicator is always presented either alone (Gabel, 1998, 
Carey, 2000), or together with the ‘Unification’ question (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). In some 
research it is scaled together with the ‘Unification’ item, and the ‘Dissolution’ (Anderson and 
Kaltenhaler, 1996), in others jointly with the desired speed of integration and the desired 
direction of future integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2004); or it is considered together with the 
‘Benefit’ question (McLauren, 2002). Additionally, the picture worsens when the same 
construct is used to measure different concepts. For example, in Norris (1999a) the 
‘Unification’, Membership’, and ’Dissolution’ questions are the components of an index 
labeled ’support for EU principles’. Given the use of different operazionalizations by scholars, 
it is necessary to re-examine the structure of EU support. 
 
 
3 Dimensions of EU Support  
 
The conceptualization of political support developed by Easton (1965; 1975) for the analysis 
of national political systems has been very influential in subsequent investigations of support 
for political systems (Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2004). In Easton’s words, “…support refers to the 
way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some objects through either his attitudes 
or his behavior” (1975: 436). In his theoretical framework, support for a political system is a 
multidimensional concept that has two different modes: “specific” and “diffuse”, which are 
directed to three objects of a political system: the political community, the regime, and the 
authorities. Building on that, Lindberg & Scheingold (1970), put forward a new conceptual 
framework for the analysis of the European Community political system. Their typology of 
support also considers three political objects and advances two new terms to describe the 
different modes of support, namely utilitarian and affective. They explain that: “…utilitarian 
and affective permit distinctions between support based on some perceived and relatively 
concrete interest (utilitarian) and support which seems to indicate a diffuse and perhaps 
emotional response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity 
(affective)” (1970: 40).  Although the authors do not clearly establish any evident connection 
with the Eastonian modes of support, in the empirical literature the concepts of utilitarian and 
affective have come to be considered as synonymous with the Eastonian concepts of specific 
and diffuse and used in an interchangeable way (Shephard, 1975; Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart, 
Rabier & Reif, 1991; Niedermayer, 1995; Gabel, 1998).8 
In contrast, in this section I contend that the similarities  between utilitarian and specific on 
the one hand, and affective and diffuse on the other should be questioned as it seems to be 
at the base of the general disagreement on the interpretation of support as explained in 
previous section. First, the different nature of diffuse and specific (Easton, 1965; 1975) versus 
affective and utilitarian (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) is explained followed by a discussion 
of the theoretical relevance of diffuse and specific. Then a re-examination of Easton’s 
theoretical framework that focuses on the political community follows. Finally a new 
conceptualization is developed. 
Lindberg and Scheingold distinguish between a rational, cognitive evaluation underlying 
utilitarian support, and a non-rational, emotional kind of support, the affective.   Easton 
instead stresses the short-term variation of ‘specific’ support and the generalized connotation 
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of ‘diffuse’ support as underlying characteristics of the two evaluations. Writing about diffuse 
support, Easton argues that although such support represents some attachment to political 
objects, the attachment is not necessarily due to affection or long-term socialization but 
“…have their origins…in our own assessment of general political circumstances” (1975: 446). 
Additionally, ‘specific’ support is not necessarily instrumental as the concept of ‘utilitarian 
support’ implies. It is an expressive evaluation of a specific event, object, or performance of 
the system. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) seem to apply a specific approach to the 
concept of attitude based on the theoretical idea that attitudes are made up of different 
components and that a clear empirical distinction between a cognitive and an affective 
dimension is possible (Hovland and Rosenberg, 1960).9  
According to Easton diffuse support is more important than specific for the survival of the 
political system. It represents a reservoir of favorable attitudes that helps people to tolerate 
disappointments with the outputs. Also Scharpf (1999) who employs the concepts of “input-
oriented” and “output-oriented”10 suggests that the first is a more important kind of legitimacy. 
However, in contrast to Easton, Scharpf assumes that ‘input legitimacy can exist only as a 
result of some thick collective identities. Input-oriented category is identity based and output-
oriented is interest based. Therefore, his conceptualization reflects the theoretical distinctions 
between affective and utilitarian modes of support as assumed by Lindberg and Scheingold 
(1970) and adopted by all other scholars. Again, the argument that the EU must restrict 
activity because it does not enjoy diffuse support is an assumption that has received little 
scrutiny (Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004).  
 
3.1 Re-examining Easton’s typology of political support 
In Easton’s framework the specific and diffuse modes of support are closely related to 
different political objects, which in turn represent different aspect of a political system. The 
political community, the regime and the authorities capture accordingly the polity, the politics 
and the policy aspects of a political system. ‘Specific support’ seems clear enough as it is a 
specific response to actions taken by authorities, support for the perceived outputs of the 
political system. The ‘diffuse’ dimension, due to its relevance for all three different objects of a 
political system, is more complex. In particular, a lack of clarity seems to occur when the 
political community is involved.  
Generally in the literature, diffuse support tends to be reduced to the “we-feeling” 
towards the social community, though this is explained by Easton (1965) to represent an 
indication of the cohesiveness of society and not as having anything to do with the political 
aspect of society.11 Opposite to Deutsch (1953), who first developed the idea of ‘sense of 
community’, as the mutual sympathy and loyalties, we-feeling, trust and mutual consideration 
among people, Easton is concerned with political community. He describes it as “…a group of 
persons that for one reason or another joined together in a common political enterprise…” 
(1965: 176) and cooperate towards some common goals, thus participating in a common 
division of political labor. Therefore, even if the EU lacks the grounding in a common history, 
culture, language, discourse and symbolism on which most individual polities can draw, and 
which might negatively affect their sense of community;12 this does not prevent us from 
looking at the support for the EU political community.  
Since a political community has been present since the ratification of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, we should be able to measure it. Thus, what we want to measure here is 
support for the political community as a political object in the Eastonian terms and not the 
‘sense of community’. Once this distinction has been made, it becomes clear how different 
kinds of indicators within the realm of the polity are mixed up in the literature. Citizen’s trust 
for others living in different member states (Scheuer, 1999), citizen’s solidarity with people 
living in different member states (Gabel, 1998), or the pride of being European (Duchesne 
and Frognier, 1995), all seem to be indicators of the ‘sense of community’ and not of support 
for the political community. 
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3.2 Building an appropriate theoretical framework 
Past research has focused on specific support paying little attention to diffuse support. 
Furthermore, it has related on measurements of the sense of community when the work has 
examined diffuse support at the expense of Easton’s political community. Here instead, a 
framework is developed which places political objects in the forefront along a continuum from 
diffuse to specific support (Norris, 1999b), or better a continuum from diffuse (input-oriented) 
to specific support (output-oriented). In Table1, a threefold conceptual framework is 
presented, which distinguishes between the main aspects of the EU political system and its 
related political objects. Yet, although the EU may be conceived as a political system because 
of its policy, politics and policy aspects, it is not a national political system. Thus its political 
objects might differ from those of national political systems. This seems to be the case for its 
political community.  
Contrary to political communities of national political systems, the EU political 
community is still developing regarding both its common borders and common political goals.   
Due to the ‘developing’ feature of the EU political community, prior to any investigation of the 
sense of community, we need to understand to which kind of political community public 
support is addressed to. The EU is not a national political system whose political goals can be 
taken for granted.13 In the course of its existence, the EU has been developing its goals as a 
political community depending on historical contingencies and national political elites. Over its 
50-year existence, its aims have been written down in Treaties that have expanded over time. 
Economic cooperation has been the hallmark of the EU political community, but political and 
cultural policies have also followed. What sort of division of labor do people want? What sort 
of political responsibility do people wish the EU to take on? 
Although analyses of public support for EU responsibility in terms of policies are 
growing (Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004; Gabel and Anderson, 2004 Sinnott, 1995; Dalton 
and Eichenberg 1998; De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999; Kritzinger, 2005, Lubbers and 
Scheepers, 2005), few attempts have been done to incorporate this indicator into a 
conceptual framework of support. The main goal of these analyses mainly has been to 
provide some descriptions of the variations in support for an EU being responsible for a set of 
different policy areas.  In this respect, some works conclude that people differentiate between 
the national or international14 character of different policy areas (Sinnott, 1995) and prefer to 
assign responsibility to the EU for those policy areas that have an international nature 
(Sinnott, 1995; De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004). Most 
stress the fact that people are “…unwilling to abdicate national sovereignty to the EU where it 
may threaten their national culture and identity” (Lahav, 2004:1175; Dalton and Eichenberg 
1993), and “…endorse national policy-making the closer the issue is to home” (Kaltenthaler 
and Anderson, 2001:152). Others found that the distinction is “between policies ‘better solved’ 
and policies ‘better not solved’ at the national level” (Kritzinger, 2005:58). Further research 
has found instead that support for policy is cumulative one tending to support the others 
(Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005), so that the EU political space is uni-dimensional (Gabel and 
Anderson, 2004). Few analyses try however to account for the variation of this aspect of 
support (De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999; Kritzinger, 2005) and those few that encompass 
both diffuse and specific mode of support tend, contrary to my conceptualization, employ the 
question as indicators of utilitarian support (Kritzinger, 2005).  
Fewer problems are involved in the measurement of the last two objects, at least in terms 
of their nature as being part of the EU political system. On one hand, diffuse support for EU 
Institutions is the support for all those mechanisms and institutions that the EU has developed 
in order to implement its goals while specific support for EU Performance, measures the 
support for those goals. No main distinctions from national political system seem to be 
needed. Diffuse support for the EU political community, diffuse support for EU Institutions, 
and specific support for EU Performance will guide the next empirical analysis.  
Finally, two main expectations may at this point be spelled out. First, high variation on the 
support for the different objects of the EU political system is envisaged since they are 
 7 
supposed to measure different aspects of the concept. Although the different dimensions may 
overlap, I expect the concept of support for the EU to have a multi-dimensional structure and 
thus capture different trends both over time and across member-states. Additionally, different 
explanatory models may account for the different aspects of the concept. Second, because of 
the developing character of the EU political community we might expect support for the EU 
political community to be more than one dimension.  
 
 
4 Data and Methods 
 
On the basis of the threefold conceptualization the appropriate valid indicators are selected 
from a longitudinal Eurobarometer (EBM) File 1970-2004. Following the arguments presented 
in the previous section, diffuse support for the EU Political Community should be measured 
with a set of questions that gauges people’s ideas and beliefs with respect to the kind of 
division of labor. The following question available in EBM data set for a period of time from 
1989 until 2004 are selected: ‘For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions 
should be made by the (National) government, or made jointly within the EU?’15  The diffuse 
support for the EU institutions is measured by asking people questions about their trust in a 
number of EU institutions.16 Finally, two survey questions were used as indicators of specific 
support for EU Performance, namely the ‘Benefit’ and the ‘Membership’ questions. Both 
questions,17 contrary to previous ones, were asked consistently over a longer period (1970-
2004). The ‘Benefit’ question seems to be a valid indicator of specific support for EU 
performance, although by mentioning explicitly ‘benefits’ it seems to refer more strictly to 
utilitarian/economic performance. The membership question on the other hand, by asking if 
the membership is a good thing appears to allude to broader EU outputs thus represents a 
good match according to my conceptualization.  
A factor analysis is then performed.  The aim is test the structure of the concept of 
support for the EU political system as hypothesized in the conceptual framework above.18 
Factor analysis represents a valuable aid in the measurement of concepts (Marradi, 1981). 
Finally, the variations captured by each dimensions over time and across member states will 





The result of the Principal Axis Factoring Analysis, as displayed in Table 2, reveals that two 
factors nicely measure two theoretical dimensions of conceptual framework. The two 
variables that refer to the conceptual category of specific support for EU performance 
(PERF) score high on the same factor as well as all indicators of diffuse support for EU 
institutions (INST) register high factor loadings on a second factor.  
 The variables used to measure diffuse support for the EU political community are 
clustered into two different dimensions: the first factor contains high factor loadings for policy 
areas such as cultural policy, education, press standard, health and welfare, and 
unemployment. The second dimension includes high factor loadings on all the other policy 
questions such as currency, fight drugs, environment, foreign policy, scientific research, 
security and defense, as well as immigration and asylum rules. Although the social character 
of one dimension is evident, the second seems not to have a specific connotation as it 
includes not only economic and political policy areas, but also environment and scientific 
research. This distinction is difficult to match with previous findings which point to the national 
or international character of policy areas (Sinnott, 1995), or their cultural or non-cultural 
character (Dalton and Eichenberg 1993; Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001; Lahav, 2004). 
Both explanations fit but only in part. On one hand the national or international nature of 
policy areas appears to be a very good analytical tool when some policy domains such as 
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education and workers’ co-determination as well as foreign policy and defense are 
considered. However, some other policy areas, such as welfare policy, are more difficult to 
locate. Is welfare policy a typical national issue, at the same extends of education? Or 
shouldn’t it better be considered a European issue, due to the indirect pressures exerted by 
European economic policies on national welfare state. On the other hand, currency along with 
immigration policy (Ludetke, 2005) may also have a cultural connotation. Additionally, it is 
very difficult to state that the distinction is between policies better solved at different level of 
governance (Kritzinger, 2005). This implies an assumption on the knowledge of people in 
terms of policies, which is something that should first be tested. What appears rather to be the 
case is that the policy patterns that differentiate the two groups are related to the different 
targets toward which the policies are aimed, namely either the people or the member-state.  
The first dimension includes policies that are addressed at the people, whereas the 
second dimension includes policy areas that are tailored for the general well-being of 
member-states, and only indirectly for their people.  If this is the case, then the two 
dimensions would identify support for an EU political community, which at the same extent as 
member-states would deal with people’s problems and an EU political community as a 
different level of governance, which supplement the member states in dealing with the 
complexity of globalization. The latent variable that underlies the measurements on the first 
factor has a clear social character, in the sense that it is directly addressed at people, i.e. 
people are the first to benefit. Accordingly, this dimension is named diffuse support for a 
Social EU Political Community (SOCPC). The second factor that underlies the other set of 
items includes those policies which guarantee some security, both in economic and political 
terms, to the member–states, in a globalize world. This has been termed diffuse support for 
a Secure EU Political Community (SECPC).  
Although the two dimensions of diffuse support for the EU Political Community are 
somewhat highly correlated (0,54),20  the factor analysis is quite clear about the structure of 
data both over time and across countries. Additionally when the two dimensions are 
regressed on the member-states’ budgetary balances21 different results are evident with a 
higher correlation for SOCPC (Rsq.0,14) compared to the inexistent one for SECPC (Rsq. 
0,003). This confirms that two dimensions of the EU Political community are evident and that 
different structures of explanation may exist behind the two aspects, as expected. However, 
on the other hand because of the similar R squares of PERF (Rsq. 0.24) and INST (Rsq. 
0.30), the latter two dimensions detected in the factor analysis appears to be somehow more 
similar.   
Yet, since the correlation between these last two dimensions is lower (0,37) than the 
one of the two dimensions of the political community, and because of the theoretical 
relevance of them, all four dimensions’ variations over time and across member-states have 
been measured. 
 
5.1 The relevant variations over time and across member-states of diffuse support 
for the EU  
Three dimensions of diffuse support have been detected and, along with specific support for 
the EU performance, they have different means and different variations of the mean both over 
time and across member-states. This contradicts previous findings that the dimension of 
diffuse support for the EU is irrelevant (Gabel, 1998) and in turn confirms the expectation that 
these dimensions measure different aspects of the concept. Overall, when all 15 older 
member states are considered over time (Figure 1), diffuse support for a Social EU Political 
Community is below zero, which means that those people supporting an EU Political 
Community taking up social responsibilities are proportionally less numerous than those 
opposing it. The highest support is instead devoted to EU institutions while somewhere in the 
middle both trends of ‘specific’ support for EU performance and ‘diffuse’ support for a Secure 
EU Political Community are displayed.   
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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Variations in the four trends over time are considerable. In the aftermath of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the three trends available are quite different. While a sudden drop 
characterizes ‘specific’ support for EU performance in 1992-1993 followed by a further sharp 
fall in 1995, the ‘diffuse’ support for a SECPC instead gradually rises from 1989 to 1992 and 
remains stable until 1995. Conversely, support for SOCPC seems to match the decrease of 
specific support, at least until 1994. Thus, contrary to previous measurements of support 
(Niedermayer, 1995), the breakdown of support in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty is 
not evident on all dimensions of support.  Although people are not satisfied with the 
performance of the EU and they increasingly question a Social Political Community, they still 
wish the EU to exist as a Secure Political Community.  However, the dramatic drop of support 
for EU performance may in part be explained by a tide of disillusionment, following the high 
expectations exerted since the early 1980s by the media and the political class, for the launch 
of the internal market on January 1992. From 1995 until 1998 specific and diffuse support for 
SECPC appear to follow broadly a similar trend, yet to split again in 1999, the year the Euro 
started to circulate. On that year, a sharp fall of support for SECPR has not been matched by 
similar drop in specific support, which instead is slightly increasing. And this is confirmed by 
research on support for the Euro (Banducci et al., 2003), which on a different indicator still 
find 1999 to mark a fall in support for the Euro compared to previous years. However, since 
2001 support for SECPR increases (distinct analyses of support for the Euro are not available 
after 2000) to its normal trend and slightly improves through 2004, with specific support also 
growing though at a higher extent. On the other hand, since 2001 support for a Social EU 
political community steady decreases reaching its lowest point of lack of support in 2004.  
For further comparison with previous investigations, variations across member-states 
are also necessary. The contention in the literature is on which mode of support older 
member-states differ from later member-states. According to the measurements developed in 
this analysis, overall if there is a gap between founding members of the EU and the later 
group of member-states, it is on both diffuse and specific support, though over different time 
periods.22 Unfortunately, as the trends of diffuse support only start in 1989 (SOCPC and 
SECPC) and in 1999 (INST), a comparison with Inglehart and Reif’s (1991) measurement of 
diffuse support is impossible. However, on specific support (Figure 2) as pointed out by 
Inglehart, in the 1970s and 1980s the gap between the two groups is evident with the original 
member-states higher in support. Yet, starting from the 1990s, Niedermayer (1995) is correct 
to claim that the two groups have reached similar levels of specific support, due to an 
increase in the new member-states. Then from 1996, the gap opens up again but this time 
with the later group leading. If the member-states that economically benefit more from being 
in the EU are distinguished from those that benefit less, within each group, the trends differ 
only within the later group. In Italy, except for 2000-2001, support is slightly higher than the 
rest of the original group. In contrast, Denmark does not increase as much as the later group 
in 1996 and runs close to the original member-states. Great Britain instead, never closes the 
gap with other countries, and represents an important outlier23.   
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
On diffuse support, while one gap between the two groups of member-states seem to 
have been filled up on one dimension (SECPC), another one appears to open up on the other 
(SOCPC). When SOCPC is considered (Figure 3) in the founding member-states, a steady 
decline over time is evident, which from 2002 gets worse. In the second group, although 
support seems more stable, the pattern is similar to the first group, though from 2001 it 
suddenly increases. This creates a gap between the two groups with the later in a supremacy 
position. When the economic crosscutting feature is considered, on one hand Italy has a more 
stable and higher trend compared with the rest of the original member-states, and on the 
other Denmark and Great Britain, are also more stable but much lower than the later group. 
As for the SECPC dimension (Figure 4), again while the founding member-states show a 
slight but steady increase over time and take the lead over the later group for more than ten 
years, the latter group closes the gap by suddenly increasing since 2000. However, in 2004 
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the two groups differentiate again with the second group becoming negative while the original 
group continues to increase slightly. Again, Italy is higher on this dimension compared to the 
original member-states, though in the last two years its support has collapsed at the level of 
the rest of the group. Denmark and Great Britain, as the net contributors of the second group 
are lower than the second group although their trends in the last years considered are 
increasing. 
[FIGURE 3 AND 4 HERE] 
Yet, in order to be a better measure, the two modes of support proposed here should 
be of some help when trying to disentangle the different types of support. When trying to 
make sense of the negative result of the Danish referendum on the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, Niedermayer (1995:69) noticed that all four indicators of EC support he 
used to measure the structure (diffuse and specific) of support, a few months before the 
referendum, were positive. Only on a question asking about support for Maastricht, the 
majority of Danish answered negatively after the referendum.  Drawing on the different 
dimensions of support described in this analysis, in the Danish case it is evident, from Figure 
5, that diffuse and specific in 1992 differentiate. While specific support for EU performance 
increases, both diffuse dimensions of the EU Political Community decreases.  Other more 
recent examples may be added. While all four member-states that recently held a referendum 
on the ratification of the EU Constitution shared positive specific support for EU Performance 
in 2004, their level of diffuse support varied (Figure 5).  
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
In Spain, all dimensions were positive. In Luxembourg, although both diffuse dimensions of 
the EU Political Community have been strongly decreasing from 2003, diffuse support for EU 
institutions seems to hold since 2001. In those countries where the ‘no’ option prevailed 
instead, ‘diffuse’ support for EU Institutions has been steadily decreasing and in the case of 
The Netherlands that is compounded by a dramatic decrease in the diffuse support for a 
Social EU Political Community. These results do support previous findings in national 
contexts which contend a relationship between diffuse support and antisystem political 
behavior (Muller and Jurkam, Seligon1982) and thus reinforce the theoretical claim of diffuse 
support to be a stronger form of support for the stability of political system (Easton, 1965, 
1975; Scharpf, 1999).  
 
 
6 New Measurements: Conclusions And Implications for the EU 
 
Over the last thirty years, the interest in describing diffuse and specific variations of support 
for the EU has been shared by many scholars, though with different conclusions (Lindberg 
and Scheingold, 1970; Shephard, 1975; Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart and Reif, 1991; 
Niedermayer, 1995; Gabel, 1998). The present paper has addressed this inconsistency in the 
literature and has investigated how public support for the EU is structured. A new 
conceptualization of support for the EU has been elaborated, proposed, and tested. Contrary 
to the common practice in the literature to measure the concept of support for the EU as uni-
dimensional, this empirical investigation clearly indicates that people structure their support 
for the EU according to the different dimensions of the EU developing political system of the 
EU. Support for EU Performance (PERF) is distinguished from support for EU institution 
(INST), while support for the EU Political community is a complex dimension reflecting two 
broad ideal-types of what the EU political community should be. Some people prefer an EU 
able to take up responsibilities for its citizens at the same extent as nation-states do, which as 
been called a ‘Social EU political community’ (SOCPC). Others prefer an EU political 
community able to supplement and sustain the nation-states, both on economic and political 
terms, in dealing with the complexity of a globalize world, thus a ‘Secure EU political 
community’ (SECPC). Thus, the consistent variation of the mean of these four dimensions as 
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described in this article confirms that the concept of support for the EU is a multidimensional 
concept.  
Compared to previous descriptions of diffuse and specific support for the EU, the 
measurements developed in this work seem to be superior in two main respects. The first 
reason has to do with the explanatory implications underlying the different measurements. 
The dimensions advanced in this article do not prompt any particular kind of explanations of 
support, which seem instead to be implicit in all previous measurements that adopt the 
assumption of similarity between diffuse and affection, and specific and utilitarian. Inglehart 
and Reif (1991), who pointed out a gap on utilitarian support between original member-states 
and later comers, indicate the severe economic problems of the newcomers at the time of 
their accession as a main reason. Niedermayer (1995), who describes a decline in both 
diffuse and specific support after Maastricht suggests that the monetary implication of the 
Maastricht Treaty and its economic and symbolic aspects, may have played a role. Gabel 
who provide evidence of a lack of variation on diffuse support found it “plausible that citizens’ 
utilitarian evaluations of the EU would reflect the EU’s economic consequences” (1998:35). 
This analysis instead, has shown that affection is not the only indicator of diffuse support nor 
is a “thick community” an essential condition for developing diffuse support. What seem to 
mark the distinction between the two modes of support are ideas and beliefs about what is 
right in the political sphere and evaluations of the political performance. This is the distinction 
that Easton makes between legitimacy and trust for the political system and support for its 
performance, or the difference in Scharpf between the will of the people and the government 
of the people. What people think is right in the political sphere may be due to both utilitarian 
and cultural factors, as much as public support for political performance. The correlations of 
specific and diffuse support with the member-states budgetary balances, while confirms the 
multi-dimensionality of support, do not discriminate between the two modes of support on the 
basis of economic benefit. Member-states that economically benefit from the EU tend to 
support the EU on both specific and diffuse dimensions. 
Second, these new measurements enable the data to show that diffuse support is a 
more important mode of support as theorized by Easton (1965, 1975) and Scharpf (1999), 
that has behavioral prominence as demonstrated by Muller and al.(1982) in national contexts. 
The empirical test in some of those member-states that hold an EU referendum has shown 
that negative diffuse support tends to better account for the opposition to the EU.  
Although this work does not offer any test of explanations for the variation of support, 
these preliminary findings demonstrate that these measurements may contribute to solving 
the main problems in the field literature. Although public opinion analyses have produced 
robust empirical findings on both economic and non-economic factors correlating with pro-
European attitudes, their causal mechanisms remain unclear. How different lines of 
explanations, both utilitarian and cultural interact and account for the high variation of 
support? The interesting variation across the four different aspects of support, as described in 
this article, seems to suggest that different dimensions of support may be explained by 
different models in which both utilitarian and cultural explanations are combined, possibly in 
different ways. Moreover, a research design that recognizes variation in dimensions of 
support may also contribute to refining country level explanations of support. Although overall 
the economic benefits from being in the EU seem to be a relevant factor on all dimensions, 
reinforcing the utilitarian accounts, member-states do not follow the same pattern of support 
on all aspects.24 Additionally different structure of explanations may also vary over time, since 
variations of support on the different dimensions over time is also important.25 
These measurements of support may also represent a good analytical tool to improve 
measurements of Euroscepticism, which in the literature tend to be confused with the concept 
of support (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005). The interaction between the different dimensions 
of support investigated in this article may capture different declinations of skepticism, in either 
its specific or diffuse features, and as such, they can provide us with some valid and reliable 
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Table 1. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT: “PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE 
EUROPEAN UNION” 
 
  ←Input-oriented legitimacy           Output-oriented legitimacy→                          
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Principal Componenet Analysis, Oblique rotation, Pairwise deletion. Trend File EBM 1970-2002 plus 
EBM 59.1 (2003), EBM 60.1 (2003) and 62.0 (2004).
Figure 1. Four dimensions of public support for the EU over time. 
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Figure 2. Specific Support for the EU over time in original and later of member-states. 

























































Figure 3. Support for a Social EU Political Community over time in original and 
    later member-states 


























































Figure 4. Support for a Secure EU Political Community over time in original and 
    later member-states 

























































Figure 5. Dimensions of public support for the EU over time in five member-states where a 














































































                                               
1
  To respect the economy of this article, references have been reduced to the essential. See Hooghe and 
Marks (2004) for a description of the main economic and non-economic models in the literature. 
2
  The ‘Benefit’ question asks, “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has 
on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community?” The ‘Membership’: 
“Generally speaking do you think (your country’s) membership in the Community is a good thing, a bad 
or neither good nor bad?” The ‘Unification’ demands: “In general, are you for or against efforts being 
made to unify Western Europe?” Finally, the ‘Dissolution’ indicator inquires, “If you were told tomorrow 
that the European Community had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or 
relieved?” 
3
  Lindberg and Scheingold found that “affective support for Europe, as such, while impressive, was not 
quite so high as the utilitarian support for economic integration” (1970:59). Instead, Shephard concluded 
that: “…it is not possible to affirm our second proposition, which stated that utilitarian support for 
supranational institutions is more marked than affective support” (1975:124). By contrast, Hewstone 
 18 
                                                                                                                                                   
pointed out that “… only for the British sample were correlations between overall attitude and utilitarian 
support items highly significant.” (1986:206). 
4
  They measured it with the ‘Unification’ question. 
5
  Here they employed the ‘Membership’ question. The ‘Benefit’ question was first asked in Eurobarometer 
only since 1984. 
6
  In his analysis, which span from 1970 until 1997, diffuse support is measured with the ‘Unification’, the 
‘Membership’, and the ‘Dissolution’ questions and specific with the ‘Benefit’ question only. 
7
  According to Gabel, ‘Unification’ tapping into both an affective and a utilitarian kind of support, would be 
a misleading indicator of affective support. The ‘Identity’ and the ‘Solidarity’ questions are the indicators 
he opted for instead. The ‘Identity’ indicator asks “Do you think of yourself not only as a (nationality) 
citizen but also as a citizen of Europe?” The ‘Solidarity’ “Are you personally, prepared to make some 
personal sacrifice, for example, paying a little more taxes, to help another country in the EC experiencing 
economic difficulties?” He observes that while positive answers to ‘Solidarity’ and ‘Identity’ questions 
never exceeded twenty percent from 1985 through 1991, the ‘Unification’ question also reached seventy-
five percent. 
8
  Illustrative at this point is the statement by Inglehart and Reif according to which: “In order to grasp what 
has been happening, it is important to distinguish between diffuse or ‘affective’ support, and ‘utilitarian’ 
support - a calculated appraisal of the immediate costs and benefits of membership in the Community” 
(1991:7). Niedermayer and Westle also argue that diffuse/affective and utilitarian/specific are “nearly 
identitical” (1995: 49). 
9
  Shepherd clearly sum up this idea when he writes that “The cognitive components match the utilitarian 
basis of support defined by Lindberg and Scheingold. Thus, support for integration which stems from 
perceived economic or political interests ... is termed cognitive or utilitarian support. Affective support, or 
the non-rational attitudes of loyalty, sympathy and shared values, may exist between peoples or may 
reflect attachment to an international community” (1975: 93). 
10
  “Input-oriented …emphasizes ‘government by the people’. Political choice are legitimate if and because 
they reflect ‘will of the people’…By contrast, the output perspective emphasizes ‘government for the 
people’…political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of 
the constituency” (Scharpf, 1999: 6). 
11
  At this regard, Easton argues that “…It does not matter whether the members form a community in the 
sociological sense of a group of members who have a sense of community or a set of common 
traditions. The members of a political system who are participating in a common political community may 
well have different cultures and traditions or they may be entirely separate nationalities…” (1965: 177). 
12
  The term sense of community has been used by different scholar differently referring both to social 
sense of community (Deutch) and political sense of community (Easton). This distinction is well 
established in Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1970) framework when they distinguish between identitive and 
systemic support, whereby the first refers to “what might be termed ‘horizontal’ interaction among the 
broader public of the system, while systemic support probes ‘vertical’ relations between the system and 
these publics” (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 40). 
13
  An attempt to put under question the common operazionalization of diffuse support at the national level 
and consider measures of support for the political community together with the sense of community is 
developed in my paper presented at the ECPR 2005, in Granada. 
14
  Sinnott uses three categories of internationalization of issues such as endogenous, exogenous and 
attributed. The first two are depending on the internal or external character of the issue itself on the 
international dimension. The latter refers not to a feature of the issue but to the will of people to attribute 
the issue to an international agency. 
15
  All policy areas included in the answer were first included such as: culture, currency, data protection, 
drugs, education, environment, foreign policy, immigration, industry, asylum, press, science, security, 
third world, unemployment, vatax, welfare, worker security and worker representation. However, because 
six policy areas’ questions (data protection, industry, vatax, third world, worker security and worker 
representation) have not been asked after 1999, at the time when the ‘Trust’ trend questions started to 
be asked, they have been discarded from the analysis. 
16
  Again, all the lists of EU institutions were included, namely the European Parliament, the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers of the EU, the European Court of Justice, the European 
Ombudsman, the European Central Bank, the European Court of Auditors, the Committee of the 
Regions of the EU, and the Social and Economic Committee of the EU. Unfortunately, this set of 
questions was only posed from 1999 to 2004.   
17
  See note 2 for question wordings.  
18
  Principal Component Analysis based on pair-wise deletion of missing values and oblique rotation will be 
applied. Although varimax rotation is much more common in the literature, here I do not need to assume 
the independence of its dimensions. My interest is more on the general structure of the concept then on 
the independence of its components.  
19
  In order to do this, an index for each dimension found in the data is constructed and the different 
variables assigned to one of the indices according to the result of the factor analysis. So, first all 
variables will be recoded in order to bring them to the same scale. Dichotomous variables will be 
recoded –1 and +1 and the ‘Membership’ question, the only trichotomous,   is recoded –1 0 +1. Finally, 
 19 
                                                                                                                                                   
the mean of each index is calculated, first over time and then over time and across countries. The range 
of all dimensions will rank between –1 to +1. Positive values indicate a majority of people answering 
positively to the questions concerned; negative values register the opposite. Zero (0) means a neutral 
position. 
20
  SECPC  0,54 
      PERF     0,20 0,32 
      INST      0,16    0,21 0,37 
SOCPC SECPC PERF 
21
  In order to validate the result of factor analyses, Carmine and Zeller (1974) suggest comparing the 
correlations of each dimension as the result of the factor analysis with important independent variables. 
Here the member-states’ budgetary balances has been employed. This aggregate variable is a measure 
of the EU expenditure allocated by member-states and member-states’ payment to the EU budget. Since 
economic considerations have dominated the accounts of support, and the member-states’ budgetary 
balances has been found to be a relevant independent variable (Hooghe and Marks, 2004) this might not 
only discriminate between the dimensions but also  provide some information on how specific and diffuse 
support differentiate on economic issues. 
22
  The third group of countries that joined the EU in 1995, considered in the general trends of Figure 1 is 
not included in the other pictures. This has been done in order to better compare my measurements with 
previous ones that did not included Finland, Sweden, and Austria. The later group of member-states that 
are here compared with the original member-states that signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 are then 
those countries entered between 1973 and 1986. In order to control for the utilitarian reasons of their 
support the two groups are split according to their economic benefit in being in the EU. This is why Italy, 
although part of the original group is plotted as a unique country, as it economically benefits more than 
the rest of the group, and the same for Denmark and Great Britain in the other group as being those 
member-states that economically benefit less.  
23
  At the same level of Great Britain are all three member-states that entered in 1995.  
24
  Great Britain appears to be very skeptical on both PERF and SECPC, but its support for SOCPC is not 
the most negative. The original six member-states support SECPC stronger than the later group of 
member-states (Spain, Greece, and Portugal), although the latter is leading on support for PERF and 
SOCPC. 
25
  While in 2001 the latter group increased its support on both diffuse dimensions of the EU Political 
community, the original member states strongly decreased on SOCPC but not on SECPC.   
